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bargaining relationships. Opponents argue, however, that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally 
been within state control. This report reviews the PSEECA and discusses the possible impact of the 
legislation. The report also identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for 
public safety employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure. 
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The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act 
Summary 
Since 1995, legislation that would guarantee collective bargaining rights for state and local public 
safety officers has been introduced in Congress. The Public Safety Employer-Employee 
Cooperation Act (PSEECA)—introduced in the 111th Congress as H.R. 413 by Representative 
Dale E. Kildee, S. 1611 by Senator Judd Gregg, and S. 3194 and S. 3991 by Senator Harry 
Reid—would recognize such rights by requiring compliance with federal regulations and 
procedures if these rights are not provided under state law. Supporters of the measure maintain 
that strong partnerships between public safety officers and the cities and states they serve are not 
only vital to public safety, but are built on bargaining relationships. Opponents argue, however, 
that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally been within state control. This report 
reviews the PSEECA and discusses the possible impact of the legislation. The report also 
identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for public safety 
employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure. 
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Since 1995, legislation that would guarantee collective bargaining rights for state and local public safety officers has been introduced in Congress.1 The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act (PSEECA)—introduced in the 111* Congress as H.R. 413 by 
Representative Dale E. Kildee, S. 1611 by Senator Judd Gregg, and S. 3194 and S. 3991 by 
Senator Harry Reid—would recognize such rights by requiring compliance with federal 
regulations and procedures if these rights are not provided under state law.2 Supporters of the 
measure maintain that strong partnerships between public safety officers and the cities and states 
they serve are not only vital to public safety, but are built on bargaining relationships.3 Opponents 
argue, however, that the bill infringes on an area that has traditionally been within state control. 
This report reviews the PSEECAand discusses the possible impact of the legislation. The report 
also identifies existing state laws that recognize collective bargaining rights for public safety 
employees, and considers the constitutional concerns raised by the measure. 
Under the PSEECA, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) would be required to 
determine whether a state "substantially provides" for specified labor-management rights within 
180 days of the measure's enactment.4 If the FLRA determines that a state does not substantially 
provide for such rights, the state would be subject to regulations and procedures prescribed by the 
FLRA. The FLRA's regulations and procedures would be consistent with the labor-management 
rights identified in the PSEECA. These rights include 
• granting public safety officers the right to form and join a labor organization that 
is, or seeks to be, recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative of such 
employees; 
• requiring public safety employers to recognize the employees' labor organization 
(freely chosen by a majority of the employees), to agree to bargain with the labor 
1
 S. 3991, 111*Cong. (2010); S. 3194, 111*Cong. (2010); S. 1611, lll*Cong. (2009); H.R. 413, 111*Cong. (2009); 
H.R. 980, 110* Cong. (2007); S. 2123, 110* Cong. (2007); H.R. 1249, 109* Cong. (2005); S. 513, 109* Cong. (2005); 
H.R. 814,108* Cong. (2003); S. 606,108* Cong. (2003); H.R. 1475,107* Cong. (2001); S. 952,107* Cong. (2001); 
H.R. 1093,106* Cong. (1999); S. 1016,106* Cong. (1999); H.R. 1173,105* Cong. (1997); H.R. 1484,104* Cong. 
(1995). 
2
 H.R. 413 was introduced on January 9, 2009, and was referred to the House Committee on Education and Labor. S. 
1611 was introduced on August 6, 2009, and was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions. S. 3194 was introduced on April 12,2010, and was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on April 13, 
2010. On May 24, 2010, the Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act was offered as an amendment 
(S.Amdt. 4174) by Senator Reid to H.R. 4899, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2010. Senator Reid withdrew the 
amendment on May 27,2010. S. 3991 was introduced on November 30,2010, and was placed on the Senate 
Legislative Calendar under General Orders. S. 3991 includes a new provision that would allow a state to exempt 
individuals employed by the office of the sheriff from coverage under the measure. See S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 8(aX7) 
(2010). On December 8, 2010, a vote to end debate and proceed to final action on S. 3991 failed by a vote of 55 yeas 
and 43 nays (where a three-fifths vote is needed for final action). 
3
 See, e.g., 153 Cong. Rec. S12382 (daily ed. Oct. 1,2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Studies show that 
cooperation between public safety employers and employees improves the quality of services communities receive and 
reduces worker fatalities."). 
4
 S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. § 4(aXl) (2010); H.R. 413, 111* Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2009); 
S. 1611, 111* Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2009). See H.R. 413, 111* Cong. § 3(10) (2009) (defining the term "substantially 
provides" to mean "substantial compliance with the rights and responsibilities described in section 4(b) [of the Public 
Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act]."); S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 3(12) (2010), S. 3194,111* Cong. § 3(12) 
(2010), and S. 1611,111* Cong. § 3(12) (2009) (defining the term "substantially provides" to mean "compliance with 
each right and responsibility described in [section 4(b) of the Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act]."). 
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organization, and to commit any agreements to writing in a contract or 
memorandum of understanding; 
• providing for bargaining over hours, wages, and terms and conditions of 
employment; 
• making available an interest impasse resolution mechanism, such as fact-finding, 
mediation, arbitration, or comparable procedures; and 
• requiring the enforcement of all rights, responsibilities, and protections provided 
by state law and any written contract or memorandum of understanding in state 
courts.5 
The FLRA would have one year from the date of enactment of the PSEECA to issue regulations 
that establish these rights for public safety officers in states that do not substantially provide 
them.6 The new regulations would become applicable in noncomplying states either two years 
after the date of enactment of the PSEECA or on the date of the end of the first regular session of 
the state's legislature that begins after the date of enactment of the PSEECA, whichever is later.7 
The PSEECA defines the term "public safety officer" to include law enforcement officers, 
firefighters, and emergency medical services personnel.8 An "employer," for purposes of the act, 
includes any state, political subdivision of a state, the District of Columbia, and any territory or 
possession of the United States that employs public safety officers.9 Apolitical subdivision of a 
state that has a population of less than 5,000 or that employs fewer than 25 full time employees, 
however, may be exempted from the act's requirements.10 
The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation 
Act and the Commerce Clause 
The sponsors of the PSEECA appear to rely on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution for 
the authority to enact the measure.11 Section 2(5) of the PSEECA states, 
5
 S. 3991, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. § 4(b) (2010); H.R. 413,111* Cong. § 4(b) (2009); S. 1611, 
111*Cong. §4(b)(2009). 
6
 S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 5(a) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. § 5(a) (2010); RR. 413, 111* Cong. § 5(a) (2009); S. 1611, 
111* Cong. § 5(a) (2009). 
7
 S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 4(d)(1) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. § 4(d)(1) (2010); H.R. 413, 111* Cong. § 4(c)(2) (2009); 
S. 1611, 111* Cong. § 4(d)(1) (2009). S. 3991, S. 3194, and S. 1611 further provide that a state receiving a subsequent 
determination of failing to substantially provide for the specified labor-management rights will become subject to the 
FLRA's regulations on the last day of the first regular session of the state's legislature that begins after the date of the 
FLRA' s determination. 
8
 S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 3(10) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. § 3(10) (2010); H.R. 413, 111* Cong. § 3(2) (2009); S. 
1611,111* Cong. § 3(10) (2009). 
9
 S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 3(4) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. §§ 3(4), (11) (2010); H.R. 413, 111* Cong. § 3(8) (2009); S. 
1611,111* Cong. §§ 3(4), (11) (2009). 
10
 S. 3991, 111* Cong. § 8(a)(6) (2010); S. 3194, 111* Cong. § 8(a)(6) (2010); H.R. 413, 111* Cong. § 8(b) (2009); S. 
1611,111* Cong. § 8(a)(6) (2009). 
11
 U.S. Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
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The potential absence of adequate cooperation between public safety employers and 
employees has implications for the security of employees, impacts (he upgrading of police 
and fire services of local communities, the health and well-being of public safety officers, 
and the morale of the fire and police departments, and can affect interstate and intrastate 
commerce. 
During the 110th Congress, the House Committee on Education and Labor further observed that 
there is "little question that public safety employees' [sic] and their role in homeland security 
affects interstate commerce.... The economic impact of terrorism and natural disasters is not 
limited to the locality where these events occur. Rather, such events have regional and economic 
impacts for which the federal government must be responsive."12 
Whether the Commerce Clause provides sufficient authority to support the PSEECA, however, 
may not be entirely certain. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has found that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, a statute enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, 
can be applied to employees of a public mass-transit authority,13 more recent decisions involving 
the Commerce Clause suggest that the regulation of labor-management relations for public safety 
officers may not be sufficiently related to commerce and may be invalidated, if challenged. 
In United States v. Lopez, a 1995 case involving the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and 
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, the Court identified three broad categories of 
activity that Congress may regulate pursuant to its commerce power: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce.... Second, Congress 
is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons 
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate 
activities.... Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce ... i.e., those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.14 
The Lopez Court concluded that the act, which prohibited any individual from possessing a 
firearm at a place the individual knew or had reasonable cause to believe was a school zone, 
exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause because the possession of a gun in a 
local school zone did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The Court maintained 
that upholding the act would require the Court to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that 
would bid feir to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States."15 
Similarly, in United States v. Morrison, a 2000 case involving Congress's commerce power and a 
section of the Violence Against Women Act, the Court found that Congress exceeded its authority 
because gender-motivated crimes of violence occurring within a state have no substantial effect 
on interstate commerce.16 The Court maintained that its cases upholding federal regulation of 
12
 H.Rept. 110-232, at 18-19 (2007). 
13
 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
14
 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
15
 Id. at 567. 
16
 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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intrastate activity all involve activity that reflects some form of economic endeavor.17 The Court 
noted that the regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is "not directed at the 
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has [sic] always been the 
province of the States."18 
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as a 
valid exercise of Congress's commerce authority.19 The CSA was challenged by two users of 
medical marijuana that was locally grown and prescribed in accordance with California law. They 
argued that Congress lacked the authority to prohibit the intrastate manufacture and possession of 
marijuana for medical purposes. 
Citing its decision in Wickard v. Filburn, a 1942 case that recognized Congress's authority under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities, the Court reiterated that even if an activity 
is "local and... may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."20 The Court 
maintained that the production of a commodity has a substantial effect on supply and demand in 
the national market for that commodity, and observed that there was a likelihood that the high 
demand in the interstate market would draw marijuana grown for home consumption into that 
market.21 
The Court distinguished Raich from Lopez and Morrison by noting that the CSA, unlike the Gun-
Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act, regulates activities that are 
"quintessentially economic."22 The Court indicated that "[t]he CSA is a statute that regulates the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and 
lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the interstate possession or manufacture of an article of 
commerce is a rational (and commonly utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product."23 
While the PSEECA would not seem to regulate the channels or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, it has been argued that it would regulate an activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce. By "improving the cohesiveness and effectiveness of public safety employers and 
their employees," it is believed that the PSEECA would niimmize the costs associated with 
terrorism and natural disasters.24 During the 110th Congress, the House Committee on Education 
and Labor noted, "The economic impact of terrorism and natural disasters is not limited to the 
locality where these events occur. Rather, such events have regional and national economic 
impacts for which the federal government must be responsive."25 
17/rf.at611. 
18
 M a t 618. 
19
 545 U.S. 125(2005). 
20
 317 U.S. I l l , 125(1942). 
21/?a»c/i,545U.S.atl9. 
22
 Id. at 25. 
23
 Id. at 26. 
24
 H.Rept. 110-232, at 19 (2007). 
25
 Id. 
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Some maintain, however, that public safety employment is not an economic activity that may be 
regulated pursuant to Congress's commerce authority. In light of the Court's decisions in Lopez, 
Morrison, and Raich, it has been argued that police work, firefighting, and emergency medical 
services are not economic enterprises or activities related to commercial transactions.26 Rather, 
such duties are public services provided by states and localities to their citizens.27 Moreover, the 
PSEECA would not be regulating the production, distribution, or consumption of a commodity 
for which there is an interstate market by requiring collective bargaining rights for public safety 
officers.28 
While the PSEECA would seem to raise questions involving Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause, it does not appear to present concerns over the commandeering of state or 
local regulatory processes in violation of the Tenth Amendment.29 In New York v. United States, a 
1992 case involving a federal requirement that gave states a choice between taking title to 
radioactive waste or regulating in accordance with congressional directives, the Court indicated 
that "Congress may not simply 'commandeejr] the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'"30 
Unlike the provision at issue in New York, the PSEECA would not seem to direct states to 
legislate collective bargaining for public safety officers. Instead, states would be given the option 
of either enacting legislation that satisfies the federal standards or becoming subject to the 
FLRA's regulations. One might also contend that the measure does not appear to require state or 
local governments to implement a federal regulatory program. Rather, a federal collective 
bargaining scheme for public safety officers would be implemented by the FLRA only if a state 
chose not to enact a program of its own.31 
See Kevin J. O'Brien, Federal Regulation of State Employment Under the Commerce Clause and "National Defense" 
Powers: Constitutional Issues Presented by the Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 
1175(2008). 
27Id. 
2
«Id. 
29 
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
10 
505 U.S. 144,161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,288 
(1981). See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot circumvent New York's 
prohibition on compelling States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program by conscripting State officers 
directly). 
31 
See also RRept. 110-232, at 20 ("The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act does not 'commandeer' 
state or local government by requiring that they enact or implement a federal regulatory program. The Act expressly 
places the onus on states that do not yet provide full collective bargaining rights for public sector employees to either 
provide the protections required in the Act, or to allow the FLRA to implement the Act."). But see Printz, 521 U.S. at 
935 (1997) ("We held mNew York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory 
program ... The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory 
program."). A court would likely examine whether state or local officers were being required to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program if it were determined that the regulations promulgated by the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority established such a program for states without their own labor-management relations programs for public 
safety officers. 
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Possible Impact of the Public Safety Employer-
Employee Cooperation Act 
The PSEECA has generated strong reactions from both the business and organized labor 
communities, with the former generally opposing the measure and the latter supporting it. Critics 
of the act emphasize the administrative and personnel costs that would likely be expended to 
comply with the measure. Because of the difficulty in predicting how many workers may 
organize or what terms and conditions would be negotiated, the cost of the measure for state and 
local governments was not estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) when earlier 
versions of the legislation were considered. 
CBO did estimate, however, that the FLRA would need to spend an additional $3 million to 
develop regulations, to determine whether states were in compliance with the law, and to respond 
to judicial review of its determinations.32 Indeed, some have maintained that the PSEECA could 
increase demands on the FLRA, either by stretching its resources or requiring new staff.33 
Although subsequent costs are difficult to predict because states may respond differently and, 
once given the right, public safety officers may or may not unionize, CBO estimated that the 
FLRA would spend about $10 million annually to administer the act.34 
Opponents of the PSEECA have also argued that the measure could raise the cost of public safety 
because of potentially higher wages and benefits, as well as the cost of negotiating and 
administering collective bargaining agreements.35 
Supporters of the PSEECA contend that the measure would give many public safety workers the 
right to organize and bargain collectively—rights that they may not currently have. The 
arguments in support of the act are generally based on what proponents maintain are the benefits 
of collective bargaining. For example, collective bargaining may improve the hours, pay, benefits, 
and working conditions of public safety workers. Higher pay and better working conditions may 
reduce turnover. Arguably, lower turnover could reduce the cost of hiring and training new 
workers. 
Supporters also argue that the PSEECA would give workers a "voice" in the workplace. They 
maintain that unions provide workers an additional way to communicate with management. 
Instead of expressing their dissatisfaction by quitting, workers can use formal procedures to 
resolve issues relating to working conditions or other matters.36 Thus, according to supporters, the 
PSEECA would give labor and management a way to work together to resolve differences. 
Congressional Budget Office, S. 952, Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2001, Sept. 24, 2001, at 
2. 
33 
Testimony of David M. Smith, in Senate, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Public Safety 
Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 1999, at 2. 
34 
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 32 at 2. 
35 
Public Service Research Council, H.R. 814/S. 606, "The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, " May 
2003, available at httpy/downloads.heartlandorg/12523.pdf. 
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, "The Two Faces of Unionism," Public Interest, no. 57, Fall 1979, at 70-
73; Richard B. Freeman, "The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure, Quits, and 
Separations," Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 94, Jun. 1980, at 64445. 
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Therefore, supporters further maintain that, by improving labor-management relations, the 
measure would improve public safety.37 
37 
Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 1999: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ, Lab., 
and Pensions, 106* Cong. 6-9 (2000) (statement of Frederick H. Nesbitt, Director of Governmental Affairs, Int'l Ass'n 
of Firelighters); Id. at 16-18 (statement of Sen. Kennedy, Member, Sen. Comm. on Health, Educ, Lab., and Pensions). 
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Table I. State Public Sector Collective Bargaining Laws 
State Citation 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Ala. Code § 11-43-143(b): Provides state and municipal firefighters with the right to 
join a union and have proposals related to salaries and other conditions of 
employment presented by such union. Public officials cannot, however, be 
compelled to negotiate toward a labor contract. See Nkhok v. Holding, 277 So.2d 
868 (Ala. 1973). 
No similar statute with regard to other public safety officers. 
Alaska Stat § 23.40.070: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for all public 
employees. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1411: Provides public safely officers with the right to join a 
union. Employee wage negotiations, however, cannot be compelled. 
No public sector collective bargaining laws. 
Cal. Gov't Code § 3502: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal public 
employees. 
Cal. Gov't Code § 3515: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state public 
employees. 
No public sector collective bargaining bws. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-271: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for state public 
employees. 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-468: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for municipal 
public empbyees. 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 1303: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for all public 
employees. 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 1603: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for police 
officers and firefighters. 
D.C. Code § 1-617.06: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for a l public 
employees. 
Fla. Stat. § 447.301: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for a l public employees. 
Ga. Code Ann. § 25-5-4: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for local firefighters 
if a municipality of 20,000 or more authorizes such rights by local ordinance. 
No similar statute with regard to other public safety officers. 
Haw. Rev. Stat § 89-3: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for al public 
employees. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 44-1802: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal 
firefighters. 
No similar statute with regard to other public safety officers. 
5 III. Comp. Stat 315/6: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public 
employees. 
No collective bargaining laws for public safety officers. 
Iowa Code § 20.8: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public employees. 
Kan. Stat Ann. § 75-4324: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state public 
employees. 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-4321 (c): The governing body of any municipal employer may 
recognize collective bargaining rights for its employees by a majority vote of its 
members. 
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Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ky. Rev. Stat Ann. § 67A.6902: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for police 
officers and firefighters empbyed by an urban-county government 
Ky. Rev. Stat Ann. § 67C.402: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for police 
officers employed by a consolidated municipal government 
Ky. Rev. Stat Ann. § 345.030: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal 
firefighters in cities with more than 300,000 residents. 
Ky. Rev. Stat Ann. § 74.470: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal 
police officers in counties with more than 300,000 residents. 
No public sector collective bargaining laws. 
Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit 26, § 963: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for 
municipal public employees. 
Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit 26, § 979-B: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state 
public empbyees. 
Md. Ann. Code art 28, § 5-114.1: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for 
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commissbn police officers. 
No similar statute with regard to other public safety officers. 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. I50E, § 2: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public 
empbyees. 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.209: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for all public 
empbyees. 
Minn. Stat § 179A.06: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public 
empbyees. 
No public sector collective bargaining laws. 
Mo. Rev. Stat §§ 105.510, 105.520: Provides public empbyees, except police, 
deputy sheriffs, Missouri state highway patrolmen, and other specified individuals, 
with the right to Join a union and have proposals related to salaries and other 
conditions of empbyment presented by such union. Public bodies are required to 
discuss such proposals, but cannot be compelled to agree to them. See NuB v. City 
ofGrxmdview, 669 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984). 
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-31-201: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for all public 
empbyees. 
Neb. Rev. Stat § 48-837: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for al public 
empbyees. See also Neb. Rev. Stat § 81-1370 (recognizing collective bargaining 
rights for state public empbyees). 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 288.140: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for bcal public 
empbyees. 
N.H. Rev. Stat § 273-A:9: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for all public 
empbyees. 
N.J. Stat Ann. § 34:l3A-5.3: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for al public 
empbyees. 
N.M. Stat § I0-7E-5: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public 
empbyees. 
N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 203: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for al public 
empbyees. 
N.C. Gen. Stat § 95-98: Renders any agreement or contract between a public 
empbyer and a union to be against public policy and void. 
No public sector collective bargaining laws. 
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Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4117.03: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for all 
public employees. 
Oklahoma Okla. Stat tit. 11, § 51-103: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for local 
firefighters and police officers. 
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat § 243.662: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for a l public 
employees. 
Pennsylvania 43 Pa. Cons. Stat § 217.1: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state and 
municipal police and firefighters. 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat § 1101.301: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for aH public 
employees. 
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.1-4: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for municipal 
firefighters. 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.2-4: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for municipal 
police officers. 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-9.5-4: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state police 
officers. 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 36-11-1: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state public 
employees, including members of the department of state police below the rank of 
lieutenant 
South Carolina No public sector collective bargaining laws. 
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 3-18-2: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public 
employees. 
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-603: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for only 
licensed employees of any local board of education. 
Texas Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 174.023: Collective bargaining rights for municipal 
firefighters and police officers are available upon adoption of the Fire and Police 
Employee Relations Act by majority vote in an election. 
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-3: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal 
firefighters. 
Vermont V t Stat Ann. t i t 3, § 903: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state public 
employees. 
V t Stat Ann. t i t 22, § 1721: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal 
public empbyees. 
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-57.2: Prohibits state and municipal employers from 
recognizing any union as a bargaining agent for any public employees, and prohibits 
the execution of a colective bargaining agreement with any such union. 
Washington Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.040: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for all public 
employees. 
West Virginia No public sector collective bargaining laws. 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat § 111.70: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for municipal public 
employees. 
Wis. Stat § 111.82: Recognizes collective bargaining rights for state public 
employees. 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat Ann. § 27-10-102: Recognizes colective bargaining rights for municipal 
firefighters. 
Note: This table should not be interpreted as providing a determination of whether a state substantially 
provides the rights prescribed by the Public Safety Employer-Empbyee Cooperation Act The table simply 
identifies whether a state's public safety officers have the right to engage in collective bargaining. 
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